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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
In this diversity case, we are asked to review the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment for defendant United 
Parcel Service ("UPS"), which was grounded on the view 
that the conduct of plaintiff Benjamin Blackburn did not 
constitute protected activity under the New Jersey 
"whistleblower" statute, the Conscientious Employee 
Protection Act ("CEPA"), N.J. Stat. Ann. SS 34:19-1 to -8. 
Being doubtful of the correctness of this conclusion of the 
District Court, we will assume that Blackburn has met his 
burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation 
under CEPA. We will instead affirm the District Court's 
judgment on the alternative ground that Blackburn has 
failed to offer sufficient admissible evidence to rebut UPS's 
proffered legitimate justification for his discharge--his 
putative violation of UPS's anti-nepotism, favoritism, 
integrity, and accountability policies. In order to reach the 
pretext issue, and so as to determine which evidence of 
Blackburn's might be admissible at trial, we must consider 
the contours of a number of exceptions to the rule against 
admitting hearsay evidence. In particular, we must 
interpret the seldom-invoked exception for reputation 
evidence concerning family relationships, see Fed. R. Evid. 
803(19), which bears on Blackburn's defense to the 
nepotism charges. Ultimately, we conclude that an 
insufficient quantum of evidence would be admissible at 
trial to rebut UPS's proffered legitimate justification for 
discharging Blackburn; hence, we affirm. 
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I. Facts & Procedural History 
 
Blackburn worked for UPS1 for approximately eight years. 
He began work as a driver in June 1986, and was promoted 
several times, first becoming a manager in 1990. In early 
1992, Blackburn was transferred to a division of the 
company that priced UPS products and services. His duties 
included development of a flexible pricing project, the 
Incentive Administration System ("IAS"). In September 
1993, he was promoted to Marketing User Representative 
for the Marketing Information Group in Mahwah, New 
Jersey. In this position, his responsibilities included 
addressing, through the IAS or otherwise, UPS's loss of 
accounts and significant amounts of business to a 
competitor, Roadway Package Service. His principal 
supervisor at that time was Gary Hopwood, who was based 
in Atlanta. Hopwood's supervisor was Nicholas Bain, who 
was also Atlanta-based. 
 
A. Blackburn's Complaints to His Supervisors  
 
In November 1993, Blackburn first expressed to the IAS 
project manager, Rich Cooley, his concerns regarding 
possible antitrust violations arising out of customer 
discounts given through the IAS.2 Blackburn's concerns 
allegedly intensified when, in early 1994, UPS began to 
modify its pricing system and combined ground contracts 
with air contracts, a "bundling" practice that he alleged 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Also named as a defendant was Patricia Knowles, a supervisor in 
UPS's Human Resources Department. The District Court found that 
there was no basis for any claims against Knowles and dismissed her 
from the suit. Blackburn does not appear to contest this ruling, focusing 
his discussion on his claims against UPS. We likewise will confine our 
discussion to the issues concerning UPS, and therefore refer to the 
singular defendant throughout. 
 
2. In this appeal from summary judgment in favor of defendant, "we view 
the facts as they are set forth [in the record], in the light most 
favorable 
to the non-moving party [i.e., Blackburn], in order to determine whether 
there are material issues of disputed fact." Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 
644, 647 (3d Cir. 1989). References in this opinion to "App." refer to 
Blackburn's Appendix, while references to "S.A." refer to the 
Supplemental Appendix filed by UPS. 
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allowed even unprofitable ground customers to be enticed 
with air discounts. Blackburn believed that the IAS project 
was generally falling apart because of inadequate resources 
and a lack of management and direction. 
 
On March 22, 1994, Blackburn first put his concerns in 
writing, sending a memo to his supervisor, Hopwood. This 
memo stated, in relevant part: 
 
        As per our recent phone conversation, I'm detailing 
       here areas where I believe that we may run into 
       significant problems with respect to Anti-Trust issues 
       going forward. 
 
        I would appreciate your running these by [UPS in- 
       house attorney] Joel Creamer in order to determine 
       whether these issues will present legal obstacles. 
 
        1) No security check exists at present to authenticate 
       or assure that the information entered by field users is 
       either accurate or valid. As you know, it is important 
       that user information be subject to some type of 
       validation process or, the worst case scenario, we may 
       be providing a discount level that could easily be 
       interpreted as predatory in nature. 
 
        While I am unsure as to the extent of our obligation 
       in this area, it seems to me that we must have some 
       type of system in place that will authenticate, to some 
       reasonable degree, the input data that our sales reps 
       are entering in order to develop prices. To leave this to 
       their discretion is, I believe, flirting with disaster under 
       the present scenario. 
 
        Obviously, Creamer will have a much better sense 
       about the company's obligation here but to expound 
       upon my concern a bit more, it occurs to me that a 
       challenge to our pricing methodology cannot be 
       defended merely by the company taking the position 
       that it didn't know what its sales reps were doing in 
       developing discounts. That is to say, it is difficult for 
       me to see where a posture of "see no evil, hear no evil 
       . . ." is especially wise given our current position in the 
       Ground marketplace. I urge you to take action to 
       determine whether this [is] as significant as I fear it 
       may be down the road. 
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        2) The present combination of Mark Matulavicus and 
       Leslie Gilstrap working as representatives of the 
       Strategic Cost groups causes me grave concerns as I 
       have been unable, as you know, to get any real 
       commitment from their manager as to the level of 
       comfort we should have in determining whether their 
       costing methodology is indeed in line with regularly 
       accepted costing practices or whether the Incentive 
       Administration System is intended to be built using 
       trial methodology. 
 
App. at 60 (ellipsis in original). 
 
On April 18, 1994, Blackburn sent another memo to 
Hopwood about his discomfort with the status of IAS. He 
suggested that it could not be properly validated and that 
there were many internal failures, including the improper 
billing of hundreds of customers. He expressed concern 
that releasing IAS to customers in its present state could 
cause "significant" liability, and "we ought to try and get 
things straightened out before we end up having to explain 
ourselves to someone outside of our organization." Id. at 62. 
On June 3, 1994, Blackburn wrote to Bain, expressing the 
view that the IAS project "will have gravely negative 
implications for the organization. . . . Both Rich Cooley and 
I have serious reservations as to whether the system we are 
building is indeed functioning properly and the potential 
outcome of this may be significant both internally and 
externally." Id. at 63. 
 
On June 15, 1994, Blackburn wrote another memo to 
Hopwood, stating that "I have serious concerns about the 
rate we are moving and what I believe to be the gross 
negligence of our group in assuring that the system works 
properly and, dare I say, within the confines of ordinary 
accepted business principles." Id. at 64. He could not "in 
good conscience" sign off on the system without reasonable 
testing: 
 
       Our billing problems have, I believe, only beg[u]n to 
       show themselves for what they truly will be come yet 
       another release of the system and I am extremely 
       uncomfortable with the idea of signing off on 
       something that is not only wrong but very likely illegal 
       in the way that it is used. 
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        You have indicated to me that I should "relax" about 
       this and stated that the issues are too complex for 
       ordinary folks to understand. I must say that while I 
       agree that the issues are indeed complex, it won't take 
       a rocket scientist to figure out that the methodology 
       we've used in creating this system lacks a basic 
       integrity that is at the core of any worthwhile endeavor. 
       I fear that the result will not only be a loss of 
       confidence by our customers but also willingly and 
       knowingly violates fundamental obligations we have as 
       an organization to our fellow employees, our customers 
       and the public. 
 
        It certainly wouldn't take a genius to pick apart the 
       cost model as it stands at present and I suspect that 
       we could easily find glaring departures from commonly 
       accepted costing practices. . . . 
 
        Last but not least, I believe strongly that any 
       challenge to the practices in place would not stand a 
       legal litmus test. For this reason, I urge you on this 
       count to not only discuss the implications of this with 
       the legal staff but to also take another crack at making 
       the Strategic Costing group aware of the potential 
       impact should additional qualified resources not be 
       assigned to work on the project. 
 
Id. at 64-65. Blackburn sent a final memo to Hopwood on 
August 12, 1994: 
 
        Yesterday we had [a meeting] at your request. I've 
       written up the following summarization in order to 
       highlight the key points of what became a very 
       disturbing discussion. 
 
        . . . In reviewing my performance, you indicated that 
       I am performing at a very high level technically . .. . 
       You also indicated that you feel I need to improve in 
       the area of "being a team player". 
 
        As you stated, your concern regards my continued 
       criticism of the methodology used in IAS to apply 
       pricing formulas which may violate Anti-Trust 
       regulations. 
 
        . . . . 
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        I believe that I have an obligation to raise these 
       concerns and your demand that I "not discuss these 
       with others" is especially difficult in light of the fact 
       that my concerns have been on-going for some time. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        You have agreed on numerous occasions with both 
       Pat Toomey and myself that this situation must be 
       corrected immediately if we are to avoid a significant 
       set of legal problems going forward. . . . 
 
        . . . I must nevertheless continue to remind you of 
       our obligation to assure proper pricing practices in 
       light of our role as the marketplace leader in the 
       ground segment. 
 
        As I have mentioned to you numerous times, the 
       stress that this subject has caused me is tremendous 
       and has been instrumental in the development of 
       serious health problems that originally led me to 
       request a transfer from the Marketing Information 
       group. 
 
        While I believe that I have been a solid "team player" 
       throughout my career, I am deeply bothered by your 
       clear message that my success on this project depends 
       more on my willingness to [toe] a line of silence amid 
       seriously questionable and unethical pricing and 
       management practices than on traditional measures of 
       accountability. 
 
        Your references to me as an "unimaginative stick in 
       the mud", a "snitch" and most interestingly, as a "nosy, 
       bean counting Jew" are unwanted, embarrassing and 
       frankly, unprofessional. 
 
Id. at 66-67. 
 
Blackburn was fired by UPS on September 29, 1994, 
approximately seven weeks after his last memo was sent to 
Hopwood. He alleges that he was fired for raising with his 
supervisors the possible illegality of UPS's pricing system, 
and that his firing violates CEPA. 
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B. UPS's Stated Reason for Blackburn's Firing  
 
The position of UPS is twofold. First, it asserts that 
Blackburn's conduct in complaining to his superiors about 
problems with the IAS did not constitute protected activity 
under CEPA. Second, UPS contends that Blackburn was 
fired not for his complaints regarding the IAS, but for 
violations of UPS's anti-nepotism, favoritism, integrity, and 
accountability policies. 
 
UPS has had an anti-nepotism policy in its Policy Book 
for management employees since 1965. The 1992 version, 
in effect during the period in question, states: 
 
        We Strictly Limit the Employment of Relatives. .. . 
 
        . . . . 
 
        . . . [W]e prohibit hiring--for either full-time or part- 
       time employment--relatives of active employees . .. . 
 
        For the same reasons, we discourage continuation of 
       the full-time or part-time employment of any employee 
       who marries another employee while either person 
       holds a management position in the same district, the 
       same region office or Corporate Headquarters. 
 
S.A. at 118. The Policy Book does not define "relatives." The 
favoritism policy states, "We Treat Our People Fairly and 
Without Favoritism. . . . We have the responsibility to avoid 
any relationship that may result in actual or perceived 
favoritism." Id. at 123. The integrity policy states: 
 
        We Insist Upon Integrity in Our People. . . . 
 
        . . . We insist on integrity in the preparation and 
       approval of all reports. 
 
        We expect our people to be honest with respect to 
       intangible things as well--in the time, effort, and full 
       performance of their jobs; in fair play in dealing with 
       others; and in the acknowledgment of mistakes or 
       other shortcomings. 
 
        . . . [W]hen we do discover a dishonest person in our 
       organization, we deal with that individual quickly and 
       firmly. 
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Id. at 134. Finally, the accountability policy states: 
 
        We Are All Accountable for Compliance With Our 
       Policies. As individuals, we do not have the authority to 
       change or disregard any of our company's policies. We 
       are expected to follow existing policies, even if not 
       always in complete agreement with them. We must be 
       careful not to misinterpret or violate a policy's spirit 
       and intent. If in doubt, we should check with others for 
       guidance. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        Our managers and supervisors set the example for 
       carrying out our policies. . . . They, therefore, are 
       expected to lead the way for other UPS people--by word 
       and action--in living up to our policies. 
 
Id. at 110. As a management employee, Blackburn received 
a copy of the Policy Book and was aware of these policies. 
 
Blackburn married Loren Morrissey in April of 1990. On 
September 29, 1993, Linda Shepard, Morrissey's sister, 
applied for a job at UPS's Mahwah facility. Shepard stated 
on her employment application that she did not have any 
relatives employed by UPS. In December of 1993, Shepard 
was hired as a Methods Analyst at Mahwah, and began 
work in the same building as Blackburn. Blackburn was 
aware that Shepard had applied for and gotten the job, and 
at times commuted to work with Shepard and had contact 
with her during the workday by, for example, meeting her 
for lunch. At no time before September 1994 did Blackburn 
disclose his relationship with Shepard to UPS. See id. at 14 
(Pl.'s Dep. at 182-83). At various times after Shepard's 
hiring, and before September 1994, Blackburn 
recommended Shepard for other UPS positions without 
informing those to whom he made the recommendations 
that Shepard was his sister-in-law. 
 
On September 14, 1994, UPS's Loss Prevention 
Department received an anonymous complaint, forwarded 
to Patricia Knowles of UPS's Human Resources Department 
at Mahwah, that Blackburn was Shepard's brother-in-law. 
The complaint also expressed concern that Shepard might 
be promoted because of Blackburn's influence. That same 
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day, Knowles and UPS manager Nigel Watson met with 
Shepard and questioned her regarding her relationship with 
Blackburn. After initially denying that Blackburn was her 
brother-in-law, Shepard eventually admitted that he was 
married to her sister. However, she gave an incorrect date 
for Blackburn's marriage to her sister, claiming that they 
were married in April 1994, after Shepard had been hired 
by UPS. 
 
After verifying the actual date of Blackburn's marriage 
(through UPS's Human Resources Department in Atlanta), 
Knowles confronted Blackburn on September 15, 1994. 
Blackburn denied that he was "related" to Shepard but 
admitted that he was married to her sister. He also 
expressed disbelief that the relationship was of concern to 
UPS. On September 16, Knowles met again with Shepard, 
who claimed that Blackburn was aware that Shepard was 
interviewing with UPS when she originally sought a job 
there. On September 29, 1994, UPS offered Shepard a 
chance to resign, on the grounds that she had lied on her 
application (by indicating that she was not related to 
anyone at UPS) and had lied to Knowles when confronted 
with this information. Shepard resigned on September 30, 
1994. 
 
Also in September, Blackburn's supervisor, Hopwood, 
was informed of the events surrounding Shepard's hiring 
and her relationship to Blackburn. Hopwood spoke with 
Blackburn and, upon learning the identity of Blackburn's 
sister-in-law, realized that she was the person Blackburn 
had recommended to him and another manager for 
openings in the department without informing them that 
she was his sister-in-law. Blackburn allegedly refused to 
acknowledge that his conduct was inappropriate, and told 
Hopkins that UPS would regret it if it pursued the matter. 
 
On September 29, 1994, Hopwood's supervisor Bain and 
Human Resources manager James Daniels met with 
Blackburn, who stated that he was not "related" to Shepard 
but that he was her brother-in-law. He denied any 
misconduct in permitting her to be hired, recommending 
her for positions without revealing the nature of their 
relationship, and claiming not to be related to her. Bain 
advised Blackburn that he had violated the anti-nepotism 
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policy and the policies on favoritism, integrity, and 
accountability. That day, after consultation with Daniels 
and two Human Resources coordinators, Bain fired 
Blackburn. 
 
C. The Ensuing Litigation 
 
In August 1995, Blackburn filed suit in New Jersey state 
court, claiming that UPS had fired him in violation of CEPA, 
and seeking compensatory and punitive damages, 
attorneys' fees, costs, and such other relief as the court 
might provide. UPS removed the case to the District Court 
for the District of New Jersey on the basis of diversity 
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. S 1332. 3 Following discovery, 
UPS moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56(b). 
 
The District Court found that Blackburn's conduct was 
not covered by CEPA, and it therefore granted summary 
judgment for UPS. See Blackburn v. United Parcel Serv., 
Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 504, 514-17 (D.N.J. 1998). The District 
Court's conclusion that Blackburn's complaints regarding 
the IAS did not constitute protected activity under CEPA 
was based on a number of factors. First, the court stated 
that it "must determine, as a matter of law, whether there 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Blackburn was a citizen of Connecticut at the time suit was filed. UPS 
is a citizen of New York. Knowles is a citizen of New Jersey. Therefore, 
complete diversity exists and subject-matter jurisdiction is proper. 
However, we note that this case was technically not removable under 28 
U.S.C. S 1441 (1994), as a civil action in which jurisdiction is based on 
diversity of citizenship may be removed "only if none of the parties in 
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the 
State 
in which such action is brought." Id.S 1441(b). Here, one of the 
defendants is a citizen of the state in which the action was brought. 
Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. S 1447(c) (Supp. II 1996), this defect is 
waived if not raised within 30 days after the notice of removal is filed. 
No 
motion to remand having been filed within this period, jurisdiction in the 
District Court was properly exercised. Cf. Korea Exch. Bank v. Trackwise 
Sales Corp., 66 F.3d 46, 50-51 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Because removal by a 
forum defendant in noncompliance with section 1441(b) does not deprive 
a federal court of subject matter jurisdiction, it is clear under section 
1447(c) that this irregularity must be the subject of a motion to remand 
within 30 days after filing the notice of removal."). 
 
                                11 
  
exists a clear expression of law, either in a statute or rule 
or in a regulation promulgated pursuant to a statute, that 
`would be violated if the facts as alleged are true.' " Id. at 
514 (citation and emphasis omitted). It then held that 
Blackburn had not provided the court "with a scintilla of 
evidence . . . that would permit [the] court to conclude, as 
a matter of law, that any antitrust law would be violated if 
the facts, as described by plaintiff, were true." Id. The court 
found instead that Blackburn had only complained to his 
supervisors "that a law might someday be violated if certain 
precautions [were] not taken or certain changes [were] not 
made," and that this complaint about potential future 
violations of the law was not covered by CEPA. Id. 
 
The court also held that no reasonable trier of fact could 
find that Blackburn reasonably believed that the conduct 
he complained of to his supervisor violated the antitrust 
laws. See id. at 515. The court found that all of the 
evidence, even viewed in a light most favorable to 
Blackburn, demonstrated that he "merely questioned and 
disagreed with UPS's pricing practices and was concerned 
about the potential legal impact." Id. at 517. It concluded 
that "[t]hese type of complaints do not constitute 
`whistleblowing,' particularly where the vague references to 
potential illegalities are mixed with and, indeed, dwarfed by 
a potpourri of other unrelated complaints." Id. (citation 
omitted). For these reasons, the court granted UPS's motion 
for summary judgment. The District Court did not reach 
the pretext issue on which we base our decision,finding 
that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding 
UPS's claimed reason for firing Blackburn. See id. at 508 
n.2. 
 
Blackburn filed a timely notice of appeal. We have 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We 
exercise plenary review over a grant of summary judgment, 
"construing all evidence and resolving all doubts raised by 
affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file in favor of the non-moving party." Iberia 
Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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II. The New Jersey Conscientious Employee 
       Protection Act 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, 
enacted in 1986, provides in relevant part: 
 
        An employer shall not take any retaliatory action 
       against an employee because the employee does any of 
       the following: 
 
        a. Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor 
       or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the 
       employer . . . that the employee reasonably believes is 
       in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation 
       promulgated pursuant to law . . .; 
 
        . . . . 
 
        c. Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, 
       policy or practice which the employee reasonably 
       believes: 
 
        (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation 
       promulgated pursuant to law . . .; 
 
        (2) is fraudulent or criminal; or 
 
        (3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public 
       policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare or 
       protection of the environment. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 34:19-3 (1988 & Supp. 1999)."Retaliatory 
action" includes discharge, suspension, demotion, or other 
adverse action involving an employee's terms and 
conditions of employment. See id. S 34:19-2(e). 
 
The New Jersey courts have repeatedly held that CEPA 
was enacted "to protect employees from retaliatory actions 
by employers," Abbamont v. Piscataway Township Bd. of 
Educ., 650 A.2d 958, 964 (N.J. 1994), and that it is 
"remedial legislation" that should be liberally construed to 
effectuate the legislature's protective intent, see Young v. 
Schering Corp., 660 A.2d 1153, 1158 (N.J. 1995); see also 
Barratt v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., 675 A.2d 1094, 1098 
(N.J. 1996) ("[C]ourts should construe CEPA liberally to 
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achieve its remedial purpose."). Like the New Jersey Law 
Against Discrimination ("LAD"), CEPA "seeks to overcome 
the victimization of employees and to protect those who are 
especially vulnerable in the workplace from the improper or 
unlawful exercise of authority by employers." Abbamont, 
650 A.2d at 964. In interpreting CEPA's various provisions, 
New Jersey courts have held that its protections should be 
construed broadly and its exceptions and limitations read 
narrowly: 
 
       The words used may be expanded or limited according 
       to the manifest reason and obvious purpose of the law. 
       . . . The language is not to be given a rigid 
       interpretation when it is apparent that such meaning 
       was not intended. The rule of strict construction 
       cannot be allowed to defeat the evident legislative 
       design. 
 
Crusco v. Oakland Care Ctr., Inc., 702 A.2d 1363, 1367 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
 
B. Elements of a CEPA Case 
 
Our analysis of a retaliatory discharge claim under CEPA 
is similar to our analysis of a retaliation claim under federal 
discrimination law. Cf. Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 
536 A.2d 237, 238 n.1 (N.J. 1988) (citing federal court 
decisions on retaliatory discharge in a case arising under 
New Jersey law); Kolb v. Burns, 727 A.2d 525, 530-31 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (adopting the federal court 
analysis of retaliation claims "as legally sound and 
consistent with New Jersey's general treatment of claims 
asserted under anti-discrimination [legislation]"). First, the 
plaintiff must make out a prima facie case of retaliatory 
discharge. The court in Kolb held that a CEPA plaintiff 
must demonstrate four elements to meet this initial burden: 
 
       (1) that he or she reasonably believed that his or her 
       employer's conduct was violating either a law or a rule 
       or regulation promulgated pursuant to law; (2) that he 
       or she performed whistle-blowing activity described in 
       [CEPA]; (3) an adverse employment action was taken 
       against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists 
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       between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse 
       employment action. 
 
Id. at 530; see also Young v. Schering Corp., 645 A.2d 1238, 
1244 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) [Young I] (listing two 
elements for prima facie case: a " `belief that illegal conduct 
was occurring [that] had an objectively reasonable basis in 
fact' " and an adverse employment action that was causally 
connected to the plaintiff's disclosure or threatened 
disclosure of the illegal conduct to a supervisor or public 
body (citation omitted)), aff'd, 660 A.2d 1153 (N.J. 1995); 
cf. Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 
(3d Cir. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff in a federal 
retaliation case "must show 1) that she engaged in 
protected activity, 2) that the employer took adverse action 
against her, and 3) that a causal link exists between the 
protected activity and the employer's adverse action"). 
 
In addition to the prima facie case, the well-established 
burden-shifting analysis that is used in federal 
discrimination cases involving "pretext" claims is 
appropriately used in a CEPA case. See Kolb, 727 A.2d at 
530-31 (outlining the burden-shifting analysis under Title 
VII and LAD). Once the plaintiff meets his prima facie 
burden, "the burden of production shifts to the defendant 
to `articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' for 
its actions." Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 
n.2 (3d Cir.) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 299 
(1997). Once the defendant articulates a legitimate reason 
for the adverse employment action, the presumption of 
retaliatory discharge created by the prima facie case 
disappears and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff. See 
id. Then, "[t]o prevail at trial, the plaintiff must convince 
the factfinder `both that the reason [given by the employer] 
was false, and that [retaliation] was the real reason.' " Id. 
(quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 
(1993) (emphasis omitted)). 
 
For summary judgment purposes, the court must 
determine whether the plaintiff has offered sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer's 
proffered reason for the discharge was pretextual and that 
retaliation for the whistleblowing was the real reason for 
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the discharge. See Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins , 45 F.3d 
724, 728 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[T]o defeat a summary judgment 
motion based on a defendant's proffer of a 
nondiscriminatory reason, a plaintiff who has made a prima 
facie showing of discrimination need only point to evidence 
establishing a reasonable inference that the employer's 
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."). Typically, 
the types of evidence that the plaintiff must point to are 
"inconsistencies or anomalies that could support an 
inference that the employer did not act for its stated 
reasons." Id. at 731; see also Kolb , 727 A.2d at 531 (citing 
Third Circuit Title VII case law regarding plaintiff's burden 
to show pretext at summary judgment stage). 
 
III. Blackburn's CEPA Claim 
 
A. Prima Facie Case 
 
In this case, the District Court found that Blackburn had 
failed to make out a prima facie case because he had not 
shown that he had engaged in protected whistleblowing 
activity. Given New Jersey case law and the intent of the 
legislature in enacting CEPA, we have some doubt as to the 
correctness of the District Court's conclusion on this point.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As noted in the text supra, the District Court relied primarily on the 
fact that Blackburn had not clearly articulated the precise law that UPS 
would be violating if its actions were as he alleged, and that he only 
complained of potential future violations of the law, rather than ongoing 
violations. We note, however, that New Jersey courts have held that a 
CEPA plaintiff need not cite "any specific statute, rule or regulation 
which was allegedly violated" when disclosing employer wrongdoing or 
even when filing a CEPA action. Regan v. City of New Brunswick, 702 
A.2d 523, 528-29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997). For example, in 
Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 707 A.2d 1000 (N.J. 1998), the plaintiff 
complained about his employer's conduct without being aware of any 
specific laws, guidelines, or government policies that his employer was 
violating. The court nonetheless held that "[s]pecific knowledge of the 
precise source of public policy [allegedly violated] is not required. The 
object of CEPA is not to make lawyers out of conscientious employees 
but rather to prevent retaliation against those employees who object to 
employer conduct that they reasonably believe to be unlawful or 
indisputably dangerous to the public health, safety or welfare." Id. at 
1015-16. 
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However, rather than engage in a lengthy exegesis on the 
matter, we will assume that Blackburn presented sufficient 
evidence to meet his prima facie burden at the summary 
judgment stage, and will dispose of this appeal on the 
alternative ground that he has presented insufficient 
evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Further, while CEPA is not intended to protect chronic complainers or 
those who simply disagree with their employer's lawful actions, it does 
protect those persons who disclose their employer's activities when, 
"given the circumstantial evidence, a reasonable lay person would 
conclude that illegal activity was going on." Young I, 645 A.2d at 1244 
(internal quotation omitted); see also Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 676 
A.2d 1143, 1156 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) ("The sine qua non of 
a CEPA claim is not the actual occurrence of a violation of promulgated 
authority or public policy, but rather the existence of a reasonable 
belief 
to the effect that such authority or policy has been breached."), aff'd, 
707 A.2d 1000 (N.J. 1998). Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
refused to engraft either temporal or geographic limitations onto CEPA 
claims, holding that disclosure of past violations of law or complaints 
regarding violations of another nation's laws are both protected under 
the statute. See Mehlman, 707 A.2d at 1016-17; Barratt, 675 A.2d at 
1100 ("CEPA protects more than the disclosure of illegal acts that are 
ongoing. To require employees to confirm that the illegal conduct was 
ongoing would inhibit them from reporting that conduct. Disclosure of 
illegal conduct that is past, moreover, like that of ongoing conduct, can 
be in the public interest."). 
 
On the other hand, while the New Jersey courts have construed CEPA 
broadly, it is clear that much of Blackburn's lamentation involved 
internal disputes over funding and staffing. More importantly, his 
allegations regarding one of the most complex and difficult-to-prove 
areas of antitrust law--predatory pricing--are undermined by his patent 
lack of sophistication in this area. In fact, Blackburn conceded that "all 
I know about anti-trust is what I've learned at UPS." App. at 53. Despite 
being liberally construed by the New Jersey courts, CEPA is not intended 
to shelter every alarmist who disrupts his employer's operations by 
constantly declaring that illegal activity is afoot--or, as in this case, 
is 
about to be afoot. Therefore, we believe it is a close question whether 
the 
District Court correctly concluded that Blackburn's activity was not 
protected whistleblowing under the Act, and we decline to reach this 
difficult issue, as our ultimate decision in this case makes it 
unnecessary to do so. 
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B. UPS's Stated Reason for the Discharge 
 
UPS's stated reason for firing Blackburn was his violation 
of the company's anti-nepotism, favoritism, integrity, and 
accountability policies, which it placed in the record. UPS 
adduced evidence that Blackburn failed to divulge that 
Shepard was his relative, and that he recommended her for 
positions within UPS without disclosing to the relevant 
decisionmakers that she was his sister-in-law. UPS also 
offered evidence that it has consistently enforced its anti- 
nepotism policy, which supports its proffer that 
Blackburn's violation of this policy was the actual reason 
he was discharged.5 Indeed, Blackburn himself conceded at 
his deposition that UPS has regularly enforced the anti- 
nepotism policy (although, as we detail below, he offers 
purported examples of the policy's nonenforcement). 
Therefore, UPS has met its burden of production at the 
second step of the burden-shifting analysis. See Woodson, 
109 F.3d at 920 n.2 ("The defendant's burden at this stage 
is relatively light: it is satisfied if the defendant articulates 
any legitimate reason for the discharge . . . ."). It is thus 
incumbent upon Blackburn to offer sufficient admissible 
evidence that this justification is pretextual and that the 
real reason that he was fired was for complaining about 
UPS's possible antitrust violations to survive UPS's motion 
for summary judgment. In other words, he must show 
" `weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered 
legitimate reasons.' " Kolb, 727 A.2d at 531 (quoting 
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. While Blackburn has suggested that the anti-nepotism policy does not 
apply to his situation because Shepard is not a blood relation, he does 
not press this point, relying instead on UPS's purported nonenforcement 
of the policy. However, UPS alleges that Blackburn's conduct also 
violated its favoritism, integrity, and accountability policies, and he 
has 
offered little evidence in response to this proffer. 
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C. Pretext 
 
1. Blackburn's Evidence 
 
In order to meet his burden, Blackburn must point to 
admissible evidence in the record "showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In attempting 
to show that UPS's stated reason for firing him was 
pretextual, Blackburn claims that he never hid his 
relationship with Shepard. Rather, he testified that he 
regularly commuted to and from work with her, entered the 
building with her each day, often met her for lunch and 
breaks, displayed a wedding picture prominently on his 
desk with Shepard in the wedding party, and was otherwise 
open about the relationship, including the fact that they 
shared an address. Similarly, Shepard testified that she 
told colleagues about the relationship and even inquired 
about it at her initial interview, and nothing was done. 
Blackburn also testified that he assumed that the 
prohibition on the hiring of "relatives" included only blood 
relatives.6 
 
We find the foregoing less than persuasive evidence to 
support Blackburn's burden, even at summary judgment, 
of proving that UPS's stated reason was pretextual. The 
only portion of this evidence that is probative of pretext-- 
i.e., that UPS knew of Blackburn's relationship to Shepard 
but did nothing about it, and later fired him for his 
whistleblowing activity under the pretext of its anti- 
nepotism policy--is Shepard's allegation that, when she 
applied for a job at UPS, she informed the initial interviewer 
that her brother-in-law worked for UPS. There is no 
indication that the decisionmakers who fired Blackburn for 
his violations of the anti-nepotism and related policies were 
informed of Shepard's comments at her interview. In fact, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although UPS's policy was less than clear in defining the prohibited 
relationships, the clarity of the policy or the reasonableness of 
Blackburn's alleged misreading of the policy are not necessarily relevant 
to the pretext issue. If the policy actually covered relationships such as 
Blackburn and Shepard's, and if this (along with the concomitant 
violations of the other policies) was the real reason that Blackburn was 
discharged, Blackburn's CEPA case must fail. 
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the record evidence overwhelmingly supports the 
conclusion that the relevant UPS managers were unaware 
of Blackburn's relationship with Shepard until the 
anonymous tip was received in September 1994, at which 
time immediate action was taken against both Shepard and 
Blackburn. Cf. Delli Santi v. CNA Ins. Cos., 88 F.3d 192, 
201-02 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that jury could find that 
employer had retaliatory intent because relevant 
decisionmakers were aware of plaintiff's discrimination 
complaints). 
 
Blackburn's stronger argument for pretext--and one that 
would be sufficient to preclude summary judgment, if 
supported by adequate admissible evidence--is that UPS 
did not consistently enforce its anti-nepotism policy, which, 
according to UPS, was the primary basis for his discharge. 
If Blackburn has presented admissible evidence that would 
raise a fact question whether UPS enforced its anti- 
nepotism policy, it would be for a jury to decide whether 
UPS's proffered reason for firing him was pretextual. Given 
our assumption that Blackburn has presented sufficient 
evidence to meet his prima facie burden under CEPA, we 
would have to reverse summary judgment in UPS's favor if 
a fact issue regarding pretext existed. 
 
In support of his pretext argument, Blackburn provides 
numerous examples of UPS employees who were related to 
other employees yet allegedly were not disciplined or 
terminated for this apparent violation of the anti-nepotism 
policy. His examples include brothers-in-law, siblings, 
spouses, uncles and nephews, fathers and sons, and 
intimate relationships between employees who were dating 
or living together. UPS responds with evidence that, within 
the last five years, twenty-nine people at Mahwah left UPS 
in accordance with the anti-nepotism policy, and that no 
exceptions currently exist there. 
 
In order to resolve this issue, we must first determine 
whether any of Blackburn's evidence in this regard is 
admissible, based as it is on hearsay and, in some 
instances, multiple hearsay. See Philbin v. Trans Union 
Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 961 n.1 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that a 
hearsay statement that is not capable of being admissible 
at trial should not be considered on a summary judgment 
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motion). Then, we must determine whether the hearsay 
evidence that might be admissible at trial is sufficient to 
defeat UPS's summary judgment motion or whether 
judgment was properly entered in favor of UPS. See 
Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 
F.2d 1224, 1234 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
Blackburn's testimony regarding UPS employees he 
believes to be related includes the following. We take the 
descriptions of these allegedly related persons from 
Blackburn's appellate briefs, see Appellant's Br. at 16-17; 
Suppl. Br. at 1-3, with citations to the place in the record 
in which the evidence is presented: 
 
       (1) Bill and Tim Jawor, a father and son (App. at 109); 
 
       (2) Jackie and Sal Biancardi, a married couple who 
       work at the UPS facility in Morristown (id.); 
 
       (3) Larry Zileski and Mr. Manzi, brothers-in-law (id. at 
       95); 
 
       (4) Barry Graziano and Tim Krill, relation not identified 
       (id. at 96); 
 
       (5) Steve Collamore and Eileen O'Connor, husband and 
       wife (id. at 97); 
 
       (6) an uncle and nephew working together at a UPS 
       facility in Parsippany (id. at 103-04); 
 
       (7) two brothers in New York (id.); 
 
       (8) Mark Hopkins and his wife, Beth (id. at 97); 
 
       (9) Bill and Art Weyrauch, brothers (id. at 96-97); 
 
       (10) Don McKenny and Vern Cormie, relation not 
       identified (id. at 97); 
 
       (11) Joe Rossano, Jack Davies, and Joe Reynolds, 
       relation not identified (id.); 
 
       (12) Lorrain Curley and Dan Grace, relation not 
       identified (id.); 
 
       (13) Karen Montemarano and another driver in a 
       Yorktown, New York, UPS facility (id.); 
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       (14) Kathleen Jewell and someone else, relation not 
       identified (id. at 101); and 
 
       (15) Howard Kaufman and "Mindy," in the Mt. Vernon 
       facility (id. at 101-02). 
 
Blackburn has no personal knowledge of any of the 
alleged relationships listed above. See Fed. R. Evid. 602. 
Rather, he testified in his deposition that he was told of 
these relationships by other persons. The alleged 
relationships are offered for their own truth. Therefore, 
Blackburn's information is based on hearsay, see Fed. R. 
Evid. 801(c), and in some cases on multiple hearsay, so 
that it must fall within an exception to the rule against 
hearsay to be admissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 802 (providing 
that hearsay is not admissible unless it falls under a 
particular exception); Fed. R. Evid. 805 (providing that 
multiple hearsay is admissible "if each part of the combined 
statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay 
rule"). 
 
When asked by us to comment on the admissibility of his 
pretext evidence, and in particular on the applicability of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(19), Blackburn responded 
that this evidence was admissible as admissions by a party- 
opponent, Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A), admissions by a party- 
opponent's agent, Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D), statements 
against interest, Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3), or reputation 
evidence concerning family history, Fed. R. Evid. 803(19). 
We consider the first, second, and fourth of these 
contentions below. We dismiss as without merit 
Blackburn's attempt to admit any of the evidence he has 
presented under the exception for statements against 
interest. Not only do we find the contention that the 
particular statements at issue were "against interest" to be 
baseless within the meaning of the Rule,7  but there is no 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. A statement is against interest when it "is so far contrary to [the 
declarant's] pecuniary, proprietary or penal interest that `a reasonable 
person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement 
unless believing it to be true.' " United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 
836 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)). Blackburn has 
offered no evidence that unavailable declarants made"statements which 
are damaging to themselves," Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) advisory 
committee's note, so as to come under the exception in the Rule. 
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indication that the hearsay declarants are unavailable, as 
required by Rule 804. 
 
2. Rule 801(d)(2)(A): Admissions by Party-Opponent 
 
Under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), a statement offered against a 
party is not hearsay if it is the party's own statement. 
Blackburn claims that the first two relationships listed 
above fall within the terms of Rule 801(d)(2)(A), because 
these relationships were identified by defendant Patricia 
Knowles at her deposition. Admissions by a party-opponent 
need not be based on personal knowledge to be admitted 
under Rule 801(d)(2). See United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 
238, 254 (3d Cir. 1983). Therefore, we need not be 
concerned here that the basis for Knowles's statement is 
likely hearsay--i.e., she was told by someone (or discerned 
from a written document) that Bill and Tim Jawor were 
father and son, and that Jackie and Sal Biancardi were 
married--which would ordinarily require an additional 
exception to make her statements admissible. See Fed. R. 
Evid. 805. 
 
Although these statements are admissible as admissions 
by a party-opponent,8 only one is arguably relevant to the 
pretext issue. Knowles testified that the Jawors worked at 
UPS in 1973, more than twenty years before Blackburn was 
fired and before UPS's current anti-nepotism policy was in 
force. We therefore find the testimony regarding the Jawors 
immaterial to the pretext issue.9 On the other hand, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We note, however, that the statements by Knowles might be more 
appropriately admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), as statements of an 
agent concerning a matter within the scope of her agency, as Knowles is 
technically no longer a party to this case. Further, if the statements 
were 
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), they would be admissible against 
UPS, while the statements would be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), 
if at all, only against Knowles. 
 
9. Although he appears to have abandoned his reliance on it, 
Blackburn's initial testimony regarding two sets of brothers--the Caseys 
and the Oberkotters--is indicative of the lack of relevance of much of his 
pretext evidence. Both of these sets of brothers worked for UPS in the 
1920s, many decades before the company established its current anti- 
nepotism policy. 
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Knowles testified that the Biancardis remain UPS 
employees, Jackie as an administrative assistant and Sal as 
a driver. This could therefore be probative evidence in 
support of Blackburn's pretext argument. However, the 
anti-nepotism policy prohibits only the hiring of related 
persons, and the continued employment of persons who 
marry while working for UPS when one of them is a 
management employee. The Biancardis reportedly were 
married after both had begun working for UPS, and neither 
holds a management position, so their continued 
employment does not appear to come within the 
prohibitions of the anti-nepotism policy. 
 
3. Rule 801(d)(2)(D): Admissions by 
       Party-Opponent's Agent 
 
Blackburn argues that testimony regarding the 
relationships of Larry Zileski and Mr. Manzi; Barry 
Graziano and Tim Krill; Steve Collamore and Eileen 
O'Connor; the unnamed uncle and nephew working 
together at the UPS facility in Parsippany; and the 
unnamed brothers in New York, are all admissible as 
admissions by UPS's employees, under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). 
Blackburn reads the Rule much too broadly, however, and 
fails to establish that most of these statements were made 
by UPS's agents or employees "concerning a matter within 
the scope of the agency or employment." Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(2)(D). We discuss each alleged relationship in turn. 
 
First, Blackburn testified that a UPS employee, John 
Cipriani, informed him that UPS employees Larry Zileski 
and a Mr. Manzi were brothers-in-law. Cipriani's position is 
not identified, however, and there is no indication that the 
statement was made concerning a matter within the scope 
of Cipriani's agency or employment with UPS.10 Blackburn 
testified that Zileski himself told Blackburn that Manzi was 
his brother-in-law. This statement too is inadmissible 
hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Although Zileski may be 
able to so testify on the basis of Rule 803(19), see infra, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. It is also clear that Cipriani is not a party-opponent, and there is 
no 
indication that he either is authorized by UPS to speak for it or is its 
coconspirator. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). 
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there is again no indication that he was speaking for UPS 
on a matter within the scope of his agency or employment 
so that Blackburn could testify as to what Zileski told him.11 
 
Blackburn testified that UPS Operations Manager 
Michael Lattari informed him that Graziano and Krill were 
somehow related. While Lattari may have been speaking 
about a matter within the scope of his agency or 
employment, Blackburn has offered no evidence of the 
actual relationship between Graziano and Krill, whether it 
was one that was covered by the UPS policy, and whether 
UPS addressed any violation of the policy by discharging 
one of the employees. Therefore, while this may be 
appropriate Rule 801(d)(2)(D) evidence, it would be 
immaterial to prove that UPS's stated reason for 
discharging Blackburn was pretextual. 
 
Blackburn testified that Steve Collamore told him that 
Collamore's wife, Eileen O'Connor, also worked for UPS. 
However, Blackburn admitted that at some point after they 
got married, O'Connor left UPS, and there is no indication 
that they were both allowed to remain at UPS in violation 
of the anti-nepotism policy. Finally, while Linda Shepard 
testified that she was told of certain related employees by 
the person who interviewed her for a job at UPS, these 
employees are not even identified by name and no 
testimony was provided as to whether they were disciplined 
for violating UPS's anti-nepotism policy. We find this 
evidence plainly inadmissible to prove pretext, both because 
Blackburn has failed to establish that it is proper Rule 
801(d)(2)(D) evidence and because, without more details 
regarding the alleged relationships and UPS's failure to act 
on them, they are clearly irrelevant to the pretext issue. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Blackburn's testimony about what Zileski told him might be 
admissible as a "statement concerning the declarant's own . . . 
relationship by . . . marriage." Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(4) (hearsay 
exception 
for statements of personal or family history). However, under Rule 
804(b), such a statement is admissible only "if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness." Here, unless there is some indication in the 
record that Zileski will be unavailable, Blackburn's statement about 
what Zileski told him does not fall within an exception to the rule 
against hearsay. 
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4. Rule 803(19): Reputation Concerning Personal or 
       Family History 
 
As all of Blackburn's evidence that we are considering 
here involves "personal or family history," the hearsay 
exception in Rule 803(19) would appear to be a particularly 
appropriate basis for finding the evidence admissible. The 
Rule allows for the admission of otherwise excludable 
hearsay, regardless of the declarant's availability (or lack 
thereof), when it consists of: 
 
        Reputation among members of a person's family by 
       blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's 
       associates, or in the community, concerning a person's 
       birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, 
       relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, 
       or other similar fact of personal or family history. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(19). 
 
a. Background Principles 
 
The matters of personal and family history that are 
within the ambit of Rule 803(19) are often difficult to prove 
through personal knowledge. For example, if a witness has 
not been present at someone's wedding, or has not 
personally seen that person's valid marriage license and 
executed marriage certificate, see, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. 
SS 37:1-2, 37:1-17 (1968 & Supp. 1999), he or she 
presumably could only testify regarding the marriage on the 
basis of hearsay. However, "[m]arriage is universally 
conceded to be a proper subject of proof by evidence of 
reputation in the community." Fed. R. Evid. 803(19) 
advisory committee's note. This is no doubt because a well- 
grounded belief that two persons are married--by those 
who know them, have attended their family functions, and 
have regarded them as a married couple--is sufficiently 
reliable evidence to prove the fact of the marriage. Other 
matters of personal and family history also "seem to be 
susceptible to being the subject of well founded repute." Id. 
That two community members are brothers or that a 
member of the community is another member's father are 
likely to be matters that have been discussed within the 
community and that have become well-established "facts" if 
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no reason has been presented to doubt their truth. 
Therefore, reputations regarding relationships and other 
personal and family matters within a well-defined 
community are considered to have the circumstantial 
guarantee of trustworthiness that justifies a hearsay 
exception. See 3 Stephen A. Saltzburg et al., Federal Rules 
of Evidence Manual 1699 (7th ed. 1998) ("[G]eneral 
reputation about facts of interest to the community is 
probably trustworthy . . . ."). 
 
In applying the Rule 803(19) exception to Blackburn's 
evidence of relatives working at UPS, we must answer at 
least two questions. First, does a person's place of work 
come within the Rule's coverage? And second, what 
foundation is required for testimony to be admitted under 
Rule 803(19)? In other words, is Blackburn's evidence 
sufficiently based on actual "reputation," or is it based on 
some other, less reliable foundation such as rumor or 
speculation? 
 
b. Relevant Community for Reputation 
 
On the first question, we believe that Rule 803(19), in 
referring to "reputation . . . among a person's associates, or 
in the community," encompasses one's reputation at a 
place of work. The advisory committee certainly foresaw 
this application of the exception in Rule 803(19): "The 
`world' in which the reputation may exist . . . has proved 
capable of expanding with changing times from the single 
uncomplicated neighborhood, in which all activities take 
place, to the multiple and unrelated worlds of work, 
religious affiliation, and social activity, in each of which a 
reputation may be generated." Fed. R. Evid. 803(19) 
advisory committee's note. In the context of reputation 
evidence of a person's character, "courts have readily 
extended the concept of community to include the 
community in which one works, as well as where one lives." 
United States v. Oliver, 492 F.2d 943, 946 (8th Cir. 1974).12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We of course do not decide here whether a witness could testify 
regarding someone's reputation for good (or bad) character within a work 
community, cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(21) (providing a hearsay exception for 
"[r]eputation of a person's character among associates or in the 
community"), as this issue is not before us. 
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Both before and since enactment of the Federal Rules, 
commentators have made the same point. See 5 Wigmore 
on Evidence S 1616, at 591 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 
1974) ("The traditional requirement about `neighborhood' 
reputation was appropriate to the conditions of the time; 
but it should not be taken as imposing arbitrary limitations 
not appropriate in other times."); 5 Weinstein's Federal 
Evidence S 803.24[2] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 
1999) ("Allowing such proof [under Rule 803(19)] to come 
from `associates' reflects the fact that nowadays a person's 
reputation may no longer exclusively be found in the place 
where the person lives, but frequently can only be 
ascertained from coparticipants in the varied activities that 
make up a modern person's world."). 
 
c. Trustworthiness of Reputation Evidence Concerning 
Family History; Foundational Requirements 
 
As for the basis of the reputation evidence regarding 
relationships within a workplace, we find little guidance in 
the sparse case law surrounding Rule 803(19).13 We believe, 
however, that the principle behind admitting such evidence 
despite its hearsay origin--i.e., "that general reputation 
about facts of interest to the community is probably 
trustworthy," Saltzburg et al., supra, at 1699--requires that 
a proponent of Rule 803(19) evidence establish that the 
reputation testimony arises from sufficient inquiry and 
discussion among persons with personal knowledge of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. This court has cited Rule 803(19) in holding that a witness's 
testimony regarding her own age "can be considered reputation 
concerning personal or family history, for which an exception has been 
made to the hearsay rule under the Federal Rules of Evidence." 
Government of V.I. v. Joseph, 765 F.2d 394, 397 n.5 (3d Cir. 1985). A 
district court within our circuit has held that family members' 
statements that a particular person lived with the plaintiff, supported 
her financially, and held her out as his child, were admissible under 
Rule 803(19) in a proceeding to determine if the plaintiff was the 
person's child. See McBride v. Heckler, 619 F. Supp. 1554, 1561-62 
(D.N.J. 1985). More recently, the Second Circuit invoked the Rule to find 
that testimony by a criminal defendant's father regarding his belief as to 
where the defendant was born was admissible. See United States v. Jean- 
Baptiste, 166 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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matter to constitute a trustworthy "reputation." Rumors 
and speculation are clearly insufficient in this regard. 
Testimony by a declarant that he heard, from some 
unknown source, that two people were related in some way 
would be inadmissible under Rule 803(19). Rather, what is 
required is the laying of a foundation of knowledge 
grounded in inquiry, discussion, interactions, or familiarity 
"among a person's associates, or in the community" in 
which he works. 
 
We find support for our reading of the Rule in a number 
of places. In discussing the rationale behind the Rule, 
Weinstein notes that "it is likely that these matters have 
been sufficiently inquired about and discussed with 
persons having personal knowledge so that a trustworthy 
consensus has been reached." Weinstein's Federal 
Evidence, supra, S 803.24[1]. Weinstein continues: 
 
        Before a witness can testify to reputation, the 
       witness must be qualified by showing membership in a 
       group that could have been familiar with the personal 
       or family history of the person in question, namely, 
       family, associates or community. . . . The judge should 
       consider . . . not only the foundation that has been laid 
       for the reception of this reputation evidence, but also 
       such factors as the significance and nature of the fact 
       towards which the proof is directed, the availability of 
       other evidence, and the nature of the litigation. 
 
Id. S 803.24[3] (footnote omitted). In discussing the similar 
hearsay exception in Rule 803(20), for reputation 
concerning boundaries or general history, Saltzburg 
explains: 
 
       [I]t is considered unlikely that a falsehood could 
       become generally accepted as truth in the community, 
       where the matter is of importance to the community. 
 
        . . . [T]he testimony must report a general consensus 
       in the community, an assertion of the group as 
       opposed to one or a few of its constituents. The fact 
       that the information has been considered by and was 
       subject to the general scrutiny of the community is an 
       essential guarantee of reliability for the exception. 
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Saltzburg et al., supra, at 1699. As these comments 
indicate, when a matter has been sufficiently discussed 
within a well-defined community so that its truth has 
obtained "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," 
Fed. R. Evid. 807, it is properly the subject of reputation 
testimony. 
 
We find further support for our interpretation of the 
requirements of Rule 803(19) in the more extensive 
discussion of the required foundation for testimony 
regarding character reputation. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a), 
405(a), 803(21). We acknowledge that reputation about 
someone's character and reputation of family relationships 
are, in many ways, very different concepts. The first might 
be thought of as a collective community opinion, while the 
second involves a factual issue. Both, however, require a 
foundation that is trustworthy and a well-defined 
"community" that is capable of, in a figurative sense, 
forming an opinion or discerning a fact. Cf. Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary 1929 (1966) (defining 
reputation as "a particular character in popular estimation 
or ascription"). We therefore find persuasive those 
authorities that have discussed the foundation that must 
be laid before a witness may testify about the community's 
opinion of someone. 
 
The leading case in this area predates the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, but is helpful nonetheless. In Michelson v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948), the Supreme Court 
discussed character evidence in the context of a criminal 
trial. It noted that a witness who testifies about a 
defendant's character is "allowed to summarize what he has 
heard in the community, although much of it may have 
been said by persons less qualified to judge than himself." 
Id. at 477. The Court limited this rule, however: "[T]he 
witness must qualify to give an opinion by showing such 
acquaintance with the defendant, the community in which 
he has lived and the circles in which he has moved, as to 
speak with authority of the terms in which generally he is 
regarded." Id. at 478. 
 
In a pre-Federal Rules case applying the hearsay 
exception we are considering here (for reputation of family 
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matters), the Ninth Circuit reiterated the Supreme Court's 
point in Michelson: 
 
        It is not every statement or tradition in the family 
       that can be admitted in evidence. The tradition must 
       be from persons having such a connection with the 
       party to whom it relates, that it is natural and likely, 
       from their domestic habits and connections, that they 
       are speaking the truth, and that they could not be 
       mistaken. 
 
Young Ah Chor v. Dulles, 270 F.2d 338, 344 (9th Cir. 1959) 
(internal quotations omitted). In Whiting v. United States, 
296 F.2d 512 (1st Cir. 1961), government witnesses had 
testified at a criminal trial regarding the defendant's 
reputation on the basis of hearsay of unknown origin. The 
court of appeals vacated the conviction, finding the 
testimony to be inadmissible, as "there must be some 
demonstrable basis evincing the competence of the witness 
to give his opinion" about the defendant's character. Id. at 
517. While we have held that a witness need not know the 
defendant personally in order to testify about his character, 
we have found it sufficient if the witness "knew of [him] and 
his reputation among the community and the persons 
making up at least one of the circles which [he] frequented." 
United States v. Neff, 475 F.2d 861, 863 (3d Cir. 1973). 
 
From these cases, we discern a clear principle: A witness 
who wishes to testify about someone's reputation within a 
community must demonstrate that he or she knows of the 
person and is truly familiar with the "community" in which 
the reputation has been formed, and that the basis of the 
reputation is one that is likely to be reliable. Where the 
alleged reputation is based on nothing more than rumors of 
unknown origins, or a single instance of "someone told me 
so," a proper foundation has not been laid for admitting 
such evidence under Rule 803(19).14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Of course, if each hearsay link in the communication chain falls 
under some exception, the evidence may be admissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 
805. For example, if witness A knows nothing of an individual's 
reputation, but declarant B, who is qualified under Rule 803(19) to 
testify thereto, informs A of the individual's relationship, and the 
statement from B to A falls under some hearsay exception, A's testimony 
about the individual's relationship would be admissible. 
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d. Applying Rule 803(19) to Blackburn's Evidence 
 
We must now determine whether any of Blackburn's 
evidence involving allegedly related persons working at UPS 
is likely to be admissible under the exception in Rule 
803(19). We note preliminarily that our determination that 
a workplace may constitute a "community" under Rule 
803(19) is limited by the requirement that a proponent of 
such evidence establish a reliable foundation for admitting 
this hearsay testimony. In other words, allegations 
regarding relationships at far-flung facilities of a large 
employer such as UPS almost certainly cannot be 
admissible as reputation evidence within a community or 
among one's associates.15 Blackburn has not, in many 
cases, identified the UPS facility at which allegedly related 
persons were working. In order to meet his burden of 
establishing a reliable basis for the alleged reputations he 
invokes, he would need to identify the "community" in 
which those reputations exist.16 Because we find that, even 
without this identification of the appropriate community, 
most of Blackburn's evidence would be inadmissible--and 
because, at all events, we conclude that his relevant, 
possibly admissible evidence is insufficient for him to 
survive summary judgment--we do not dwell on the 
shortcomings in his evidence regarding the work location of 
most of the allegedly related persons he offers. 
 
Blackburn testified that "[i]t was known by myself, 
certainly, and numerous other people, I presume, that Bill 
and Art [Weyrauch] were brothers. I believe that it was a 
regular topic of discussion." App. at 97. Although the 
requirements we have set forth above regarding admission 
of such reputation evidence may not be met by Blackburn's 
testimony, we will assume that upon further development 
of the background to his allegations, this testimony might 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. UPS currently has 326,800 employees worldwide, and 291,500 in the 
United States alone, at more than 1700 facilities. See UPS at a Glance 
(visited June 3, 1999) http://www.ups.com/about/glance.html>. 
 
16. We do note that most of Blackburn's examples appear to concern 
UPS employees at facilities in Northern New Jersey, which might 
constitute an adequate community for Rule 803(19) purposes, assuming 
that they are somehow linked to each other. 
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be admissible at trial, see Petruzzi's, 998 F.2d at 1234 n.9, 
and we therefore consider it below in our analysis of 
whether summary judgment for UPS was properly granted. 
 
As for Don McKenny and Vern Cormie, Blackburn could 
not state how they were related, and admitted that the 
basis of his information that they were related was 
"something that I was told by someone I worked with at 
UPS sometime before I left the company." App. at 97. This 
clearly fails to meet the standards we have outlined for 
reputation evidence under Rule 803(19). Not only does it 
appear that Blackburn does not know McKenny and 
Cormie (i.e., he could not identify their alleged relationship), 
but the source of his information--"something that I was 
told by someone"--cannot even be identified, let alone 
measured for its trustworthiness. 
 
The same is true of the alleged relationships between Joe 
Rossano, Jack Davies, and Joe Reynolds (relationship 
unknown, and information based on "something that 
someone told [Blackburn]"); between Lorrain Curley and 
Dan Grace (source of information unknown); between Karen 
Montemarano and an unknown driver; between Kathleen 
Jewell and an unnamed relative ("I just remember that she 
had a relative of some type working there"); and between 
Howard Kaufman and "Mindy" ("it was my understanding" 
that they were related). Each of these cases fails to meet 
the standard we have established for admitting hearsay 
evidence under the exception for reputation concerning 
family matters. In each case, Blackburn does not appear to 
be familiar with the persons named, fails to identify the 
community involved, and does not establish any basis, let 
alone a reliable one, for the information that he is offering. 
In other words, he has failed demonstrably to identify a 
reputation concerning family relationships that would bring 
this testimony within the exception in Rule 803(19). 
 
Finally, while we have held that Blackburn may not 
testify about what Zileski told him, as this is hearsay not 
within any exception, see supra note 11, Zileski himself 
could almost certainly testify at trial that Manzi is his 
brother-in-law. We will assume that Blackburn's testimony 
regarding what Zileski told him was effectively a proffer of 
the testimony that Zileski himself would give at trial, and 
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we therefore treat this as evidence capable of being 
admitted at trial. However, Blackburn has presented no 
evidence that UPS knew of Zileski and Manzi's relationship, 
or that the company knew and did nothing about it. 
Therefore, this evidence, while potentially admissible under 
a hearsay exception, is not probative of pretext. 
 
5. Summary Judgment 
 
We conclude that Blackburn's evidence that UPS 
decisionmakers were aware of his relationship to Shepard, 
and later fired him for his whistleblowing activity under the 
pretext of its anti-nepotism policy, is, without more, 
insufficient to overcome summary judgment. As we have 
detailed supra Part III.C.2-.4, we find that virtually none of 
his evidence regarding other UPS employees who were 
allegedly related would likely be admissible at trial as 
relevant evidence that falls within a hearsay exception. We 
must therefore determine whether Blackburn has offered 
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding UPS's stated reason for firing him. 
 
Blackburn concedes that there were numerous instances 
in which UPS terminated employees who violated its anti- 
nepotism policy. We have held that only the following 
pretext evidence might be admissible at trial: Blackburn's 
testimony that Bill and Art Weyrauch were generally known 
as brothers among UPS employees, and Shepard's 
testimony that she informed UPS's interviewer about her 
relationship to Blackburn. This scintilla of evidence is 
clearly inadequate to create a genuine issue of material fact 
on UPS's proffered reason for firing Blackburn. In sum, on 
this record, we are satisfied that, even assuming that 
Blackburn has met his prima facie burden under CEPA, he 
has failed to adequately rebut UPS's proffered reason for 
his discharge by pointing to sufficient "inconsistencies or 
anomalies that could support an inference that the 
employer did not act for its stated reasons." Sempier v. 
Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 731 (3d Cir. 1995). The 
judgment of the District Court will therefore be affirmed. 
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